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ABSTRACT
Objective: To identify the occurrence of errors in the use of equipment by nurses working 
in intensive care and analyzing them in the framework of James Reason’s theory of human 
error. Method: Qualitative field study in the intensive care unit of a federal hospital in 
the city of Rio de Janeiro. Observation and interviews were conducted with eight nurses, 
from March to December 2014. Content analysis was used for the interviews, as well as 
the description of the scenes observed. Results: Lapses of memory and attention were 
identified in the handling of infusion pumps, as well as planning failures during the 
programming of monitors. Conclusion: Errors cause adverse events that compromise 
patient safety. The authors propose creation of an instrument for daily checking of 
equipment, with checks throughout the work process in the programming of infusion 
pumps and monitors, in order to reduce failures and memory lapses.
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INTRODUCTION
The National Patient Safety Program (NPSP) has the 
general objective to contribute to the quality of care in all 
health facilities in Brazil, in partnership with the national 
public Unified Health System (SUS). For its effective de-
ployment, one strategy of the NPSP is implementation of 
various methods to provide professionals and students with 
education, orientation and training on patient safety(1).
One of the areas of interest of the program is safe use 
of equipment, given the variety of devices, manufacturers, 
technical specifications to operate each equipment, and the 
need for knowledge and attention to manage these aspects(1).
This concern is based on evidence from the literature on 
the occurrence of user errors in the handling of equipment, 
especially in the intensive care unit (ICU) environment(2-5), 
which has a large presence of such equipment. Equipment-
related incidents, known as adverse events(1), have caused 
harm to patients, as shown in studies on this subject. For 
example, one study in France compared records from 1998 
with those from 2005-2006 to determine whether the num-
ber, severity and causes of adverse events related to equip-
ment used in ICUs in the country had changed(2).
The authors concluded that over a period of two years, 
76 patients died due to equipment-related incidents, and 
197 were victims of severe incidents. Human error was the 
cause of one-third of incidents in general, and the main 
cause of those which were classified as severe, showing that 
the number of incidents resulting from the improper use 
of equipment increased between the two periods studied(2).
Incorrect use was also identified in another study that 
tracked and categorized incidents with equipment. In that 
study, 358 of 1,021 adverse events analyzed were due to 
incorrect use of equipment, making it the most frequent 
cause of harm to patients. The authors noted that of the 
1,021 adverse events studied, 29 were associated with more 
than temporary damage, which resulted in longer stay in the 
ICU, permanent damage and interventions to maintain life 
and even possible reasons for death(3).
Findings from a third study that measured the stimulus-
response time of the health team to alarms from monitoring 
equipment in intensive care corroborated the foregoing stud-
ies. In 40 hours of observation, 227 alarms were triggered, of 
which 145 were not responded to by the team, in addition 
to observations of inadequate programming of physiological 
variables and alarm parameters. This may have implied that 
alarms were ignored and patient safety was compromised(4).
The present study identified human error as a cause of 
adverse events, and one of the risk factors involved in incor-
porating equipment as part of the care provided in the ICU, 
and hence a factor that requires attention when designing 
initiatives for patient safety.
In order to deal with this phenomenon, these initia-
tives require an understanding of human error. From this 
perspective, the theory of human error, proposed in 1990 by 
James Reason is useful. Reason’s theory is based on cogni-
tive psychology, and seeks to understand the processes that 
cause human error in an attempt to apply this knowledge 
in practice by creating mechanisms to counter the harmful 
effects of such error(6).
Reason defines error “as a general term covering all those 
occasions in which a traced sequence of mental or physical 
activities fails to achieve the expected result, and when these 
failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of chance”(6). 
Error only occurs in intentional actions, which may be: per-
formance errors, which are slips and lapses; and errors of 
planning/knowledge, which are mistakes(7-8). Slips are ob-
servable actions that occur differently from the prescribed 
plan, and lapses are associated with memory. Mistakes are 
errors in the selection of a goal or the means to achieve it(7).
Based on the evidence of user error problems in the use 
of equipment, there is a need to understand this phenom-
enon under the lens of these concepts. In the present study, 
this understanding is based on nursing in the ICU, because 
there is a technological dimension to nursing practice in 
this environment(9). Nurses need to observe and understand 
the codes emitted by equipment, in order to care for pa-
tients without causing damage. Because technologies ap-
plied in ICU care transmit signals from the patient’s body 
by means of technological language, to avoid improper use 
of these technologies, the correct interpretation of this lan-
guage is necessary.
Most studies dealing with adverse events in the context 
of nursing care(10-11) identify faulty use of equipment as one 
of its causes; however, they do not delve into the character-
istics of these incidents in a manner that contributes to the 
understanding of how and why they occur, so that effec-
tive interventions can be adopted. To improve the quality 
of care, the NPSP foresees the creation of a protocol on 
the application of technologies. Therefore, it is necessary to 
have data on the occurrence of this type of adverse event in 
order to encourage research in this field of patient safety(1).
The research question for the present study was: What is 
the nature of the use of equipment by nurses working in the ICU, 
and what is the relationship between such use andthe occur-
rence of errors? This study aimed to identify the occurrence 
of errors during the use of equipment by nurses working in 
intensive care, and to analyze them from the lens of James 
Reason’s theory of human error.
METHOD
This was a descriptive and qualitative field study that 
applied Reason’s theory of human error(6-8). Selection of this 
analytical framework was justified by the fact that it was 
adopted by the NPSP to discuss unsafe acts in care practice, 
and propose measures that maximize patient safety.
The field of study was the ICU of a federal university 
hospital located in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro. Data 
were produced from March to December 2014. The authors 
decided to conduct research during the day shift, since the 
most direct care interventions for the patient that require 
the use of technological devices occur during this shift. The 
high incidence of care, which include diagnostic and thera-
peutic procedures during this shift justifies such a choice, 
as it provides more opportunities to observe the ways that 
nurses deal with technologies.
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Participants were nurses who met the following inclu-
sion criteria: working in the ICU; directly involved in pa-
tient care; and present during the period of data collection.
The ICU has an area for  clinical patients with nine beds, 
and an area for surgical patients with six beds. The nursing 
staff of the clinical unit is composed of two nurses per shift 
and one nurse for surgery, all of which rotate on a scale of 
12 hours of work per 60 hours of rest. The possible number 
of participants in the day shift were nine nurses, eight of 
which participated in the study, because one was not present 
during the data collection period.
The data were produced through systematic observa-
tion, which sought to portray the everyday practice of the 
nurses, and observe how they acted in relation to the use 
of technologies in patient care in the ICU. To support the 
interpretation of data, the researcher was embedded in the 
field, participating in the daily practices of the nursing pro-
fessionals working in the ICU.
An observation script consisting of two parts was ap-
plied, the first part aimed to describe the situation and con-
tained the date and time of observation, information about 
the patient involved (diagnostic and clinical conditions), 
and focused on gathering data on the professional training, 
qualification and performance, in the initial observation by 
the participant.
The other part of the instrument focused on exploring 
the object of study. In the interests of the research, it was 
decided to observe situations centered on the nurses’ use 
of the following equipment: monitoring of hemodynamic 
parameters, infusion of solutions and nutrients, and ventila-
tion. This choice was based on a previous literature review, 
which indicated a higher incidence of errors involving these 
equipment, and which thus guided the construction of this 
part of the instrument(2-3, 5, 12).
The information generated was based on configuration 
of data by the professional; interpretation of the meanings 
of actions or commands; ability to detect and resolve prob-
lems; handling of alarms; handling difficulties; and inter-
ruptions, among others. Observation of equipment use was 
done during the daily care of biological needs, admission 
and transfer of patients, in the performance of highly com-
plex procedures and techniques, work in times of clinical 
complications, and the clinical meeting of the nursing team.
The observation data were recorded in a field journal, 
and detailed description was applied, which is a description 
of the significant structures from which gestures, rituals, 
codes and actions are produced, perceived and interpreted 
by the participants themselves and the researcher(13). Care 
scenes were then described in detail from notes, which in-
cluded the account of the subjects who participated ipsis 
literis; methodological notes of the researcher’s impressions; 
and the narrative of facts by the researcher. At the end, there 
was a quantitative total of 130 hours of observation.
The researchers then sought to portray the perspective 
of the participants by interviewing them. The researcher di-
rected questions to the participants involved in the scenes 
recorded, which were developed from previous analysis 
of the observed situations. A script with questions that 
encompassed the following aspects was developed: types 
of errors, related factors, behavior, and damages to patients. 
The goal was to support the interpretation by the researcher 
from analysis of observational data.
Participants were discretely approached at a time after 
they had performed patient care, and the researcher sought 
to refer to the situation that they had just experienced. 
Responses were recorded in the field journal. The interview 
was used throughout the analysis as support for interpreta-
tion of observation data.
Analysis of the scenes recorded was used to translate 
and explain(13) the procedures adopted by the nurses in 
their handling of equipment. This enabled the categoriza-
tion of the errors into two types: lapses and slips in the 
use of infusion pumps; and, mistakes in the use of moni-
tors, categorizations supported by the guiding theoretical 
framework of the study(6-8). This was followed up by con-
tent analysis of the interviews by a deductive approach, 
according to the categorization based on their presence in 
the testimonials(14). These were tracked in the search for 
the occurrence of content that could portray the meanings 
provided by the participants to their conduct, particularly 
those that were indicative of adverse events, providing 
deeper description of the characteristics of errors, and giv-
ing density to the same.
Under this logic, the testimonials were used in coun-
terpoint with the scenes observed. This data supported in-
terpretation through the lens of the theoretical framework, 
discussing safety in the light of the knowledge gained on 
the subject.
The project was approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee at the hospital where the research was under-
taken, under Protocol no. 260.345/13, in compliance with 
Resolution 466/2012 of the National Health Council, on 
research involving human subjects. Participants signed 
a free and informed consent form, and their confidenti-
ality was guaranteed by numeric identification by order 
of observation.
RESULTS
Lapses and sLips in the use of infusion pumps
Analysis of the conduct of nurses in their use of ma-
chinery during patient care in the ICU revealed a set of 
situations in which errors were observed that compromised 
patient safety. Among these errors, those involving infusion 
pumps (IP) stood out in the reports of the nurses when they 
conferred meaning to the scenes observed, which indicated 
the frequency with which the mistakes occur.
The errors occur with the pumps, these are terrible, they are val-
ues entered incorrectly, incorrect settings, or when the person for-
gets that s/he interrupted the infusion for some reason, but forgot 
to restart it. Only the pumps cause more problems (Nurse 5).
Here, you will find a lot of use errors; don’t even talk about the 
pump (Nurse 2).
The problems with the pumps are the most common, these always 
happen (Nurse 7).
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The statement above by Nurse 5 indicates that the type 
of error that occurs with the infusion pumps is in its execu-
tion, because the actions of the nurses in their handling of 
the pumps are not in accordance with the desired intention. 
One such execution error indicated by this participant is that 
of lapse. One scene which exemplified this type of error was 
observed while applying a dressing on a patient by Nurse 2.
Nurse 2 noticed the alarm emitted by an infusion pump 
and, after analyzing it, called the nursing technician and 
said: — Look, this pump is sounding an alarm all the time; you 
changed the diet and forgot to reset the volume. The technician 
then responded: — I always forget that! (Excerpt from field 
journal, Nurse 2, 4/24/2014, 9:00am-12:00pm).
These interruptions can have serious consequences on 
patients. In the meanwhile, as in the situation described 
above, when the interruption is not identified, the patient 
does not receive the proper amount of nutrients, which im-
plies the administration of a volume less than prescribed. In 
the case of medications, interruptions can have immediate 
effects on hemodynamic changes and clinical evolution.
These memory lapses in recording parameters show that 
when devices are programmed, they require special atten-
tion by the nurses, especially those in management, and also 
when this function is delegated to another member of the 
team. This is particularly important when, in analysis of the 
field journal, the occurrence of slips was verified when en-
tering values of infusion rates of medicines and nutrients to 
patients in pumps, as noted in the scenes described below.
In the first one, the slip was identified in a condition 
of heart failure. During resuscitation attempts, Nurse 8 
evaluated the infusions for the patient and noted that the 
pump that infused the sodium nitroprusside – a vasoactive 
used in the treatment of severe hypertension – was pro-
grammed for 10ml/h, when the prescription was 1 ml/h. 
When Nurse 8 questioned who had programmed the infu-
sion pump, one of the nursing technicians responded: — I’m 
the one who programmed it, but I think I programmed it for 
1 ml/h. (Excerpt from field journal, Nurse 8, 10/21/2014, 
07:30am-12:30pm).
A slip in programming of the IP was also repeated dur-
ing an episode of accidental extubation. The emergency 
physician was contacted to perform new intubation, and in 
the course of this procedure, asked the nursing technician 
to administer 1 ml of Fentanyl for sedation. The nursing 
technician pushed a button on the IP which triggered a 
flush (rapid infusion), but did not perceive the alarm that 
signaled the end of the prescribed volume of infusion. As 
a result, rather than administering 1 ml, 5 ml of Fentanyl 
were infused.
Following the event, Nurse 7 questioned the technician 
about the incident, to which she responded: — I kept press-
ing the button to do a bolus, but I didn’t hear the alarm that 
indicates 1 ml. When I looked, it was already at 5, and then I 
stopped. I swear I didn’t hear it! Nurse 7 continued: — Look, 
when it is like that, don’t rely just on alarms, always look at the 
monitor to check properly. I know that the screen is small, but 
we have to be careful not to have a bigger problem (Excerpt 
from field journal, 10/7/2014, Nurse 7, 07:30am-12:30pm).
This data shows the existence of factors related to the 
user, such as the ability to hear and see, as well as factors 
related to the machinery, including a small screen, which in-
terferes with the user-machine interface, and must be taken 
into account in analysis of systemic errors. This assertion 
is corroborated by the following excerpt of the interview 
with Nurse 7, when she described other experiences with 
problems with the IP. She commented:
Once I installed a diet in a patient that was supposed to 
be 65 ml/h, and I ended up programming it for 655ml/h. My 
finger is fat, because I am chubby. So I did not pay attention to 
the value, and I started the diet. A few minutes later I looked at 
the bottle and it was half empty. I quickly stopped the diet, and 
nothing happened to the patient.
She continued: The other day, a nursing technician entered 
norepinephrine at 11ml/h for a patient who needed 1ml/h. Soon 
afterwards, the monitor perceived the increased blood pressure, 
the infusion was interrupted, and nothing happened to the pa-
tient because of it. But these buttons are very small, and the 
display too, which gets in the way. In my opinion, these could be 
larger to help us (Nurse 7).
In her statement above, Nurse 7 demonstrated a ten-
dency to minimize the consequences of the errors. However, 
errors in programming of the IP results in adverse events, 
some of which require intervention to save the patient’s life, 
as in the event described below.
At 10:30 am the female patient, 72 years old, diagnosed 
with cirrhosis and pulmonary emphysema, breathing ambi-
ent air, presented an episode of vomiting accompanied by a 
drop of SaO2 by 85% and intense breathlessness – symp-
toms suggestive of pulmonary aspiration. Upon reaching 
the patient’s bed, Nurse 1 and the nursing technician de-
tected the problem and analyzed her condition. The techni-
cian stated: It was the diet, it is set to 625 ml/h (the correct ratio 
was 62.5 ml/h). I made a mistake. Nurse 1 responds: We are 
going to deal with this now, and we can talk about it later. The 
physician was called for endotracheal intubation and start 
of artificial ventilation (Excerpt from field journal, Nurse 1, 
12/17/2014, 07:30am-12:30pm).
mistakes in the use of monitors
The use of monitoring systems demonstrated the pres-
ence of mistakes that put patients at risk. The incorrect pa-
rameterization of monitors interferes in the transmission 
by these machines of the vital signs sent by the patient’s 
body, and that are indicative of clinical changes. Detection 
of these changes by the multidisciplinary team is impeded, 
causing delays in adopting therapeutic conduct.
This type of planning failure came to light when the re-
searcher perceived a major elevation in the blood pressure of 
a patient (180 x 100mmHg) on the multi-parameter monitor. 
However, the monitoring equipment was not emitting any 
sound or light to signal the health care team of this change. 
Upon checking the pre-determined clinical parameters for 
the alarm of the device, it was identified that they were pro-
grammed to signal only if the blood pressure was higher than 
220 x 110 mmHg, although this was a patient with no his-
tory of hypertension and was using Norepinephrine.
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The nursing technician asked what was happening. After 
explanation by the researcher, the technician provided the 
following justification: The nurses program this device when 
the patient is admitted, sometimes it stays that way, and they al-
ways pass by the Box and have the habit of looking even without 
the alarm. She heads to the post and continues: Nurse 5, have 
a look because the blood pressure is 18 and it (the monitor) is not 
sounding an alarm. She’s taking Norepinephrine (Excerpt from 
field journal, Nurse 5, 4/29/2014, 12:40pm-4:40pm).
The lack of an alarm from the monitor indicated by this 
nursing technician occurred again during transfer of the 
patient for a CT examination. During repositioning of the 
patient in bed after her return from the examination, Nurse 
3 asked the technician who participated in the transfer: — 
Has he had this blood pressure (170 × 100mmHg) the entire 
time or just since he’s been back? The technician responded: 
He was fine the entire time, this just happened now (Excerpt 
from field journal, Nurse 3, 5/29/2014, 1:00pm-5:00pm).
However, the equipment was programmed to sound 
an alarm only if the blood pressure was higher than 
200 × 100mmHg, which denotes that the device did not do 
so from this pressure oscillation during the transfer of this 
patient, compromising its detection by the nursing technician.
DISCUSSION
The results of this study warn that the use of infusion 
pumps is a cause for concern in relation to equipment safety, 
because many users make errors when using them. Such 
data is corroborated by other studies that show the char-
acteristics of incidents involving equipment, the example 
of those that analyzed international databases of incident 
notifications related to patient safety.
In the case of the French notification agency, of all the 
events with equipment reported in 2005-2006, infusion 
pumps accounted for 44% (1,843). Of these, of the 694 
incidents in which it was possible to investigate the cause 
with certainty, 39% were related to improper use(2). Among 
incidents reported between 2006-2007 to the patient safety 
agency of the United Kingdom, incidents with syringe/in-
fusion pumps were the most frequent, representing 185 of 
1,021 adverse events notified. As for the characteristics of 
these incidents, 32% (60) occurred due to incorrect use and 
28% (52) caused life-threatening damage(3).
There is also research indicating that infusion pumps 
are responsible for between 30 and 60% of all errors in the 
administration of intravenous medication(5). This statement 
is supported by another study on discrepancies between 
prescription medications for infusions and programming 
of pumps. Of 296 observations of drug infusions and 231 
of intravenous fluids, the frequency of discrepancies be-
tween the prescriptions and programming of the pump 
ranged from 24.3% for medicines compared to 42.4% 
for liquids(15).
In the present study, the situations involving nurses 1 
and 8 during the programming of infusion pumps portray 
the magnitude of this problem and its immediate impact 
on the patient. The occurrence of a situation similar to that 
experienced by the nurses who participated in the present 
study was documented by researchers when the total par-
enteral nutrition infusion was set to 625 ml/h (contrary to 
62, 5 ml/h). After 1.5 hours, the error was recognized and 
the infusion terminated. Despite treatment for hyperkale-
mia and hyperglycemia, the patient died(5).
These types of errors of action found in the results and 
corroborated in the literature are part of the model pro-
posed by Reason to explain the mechanisms that cause the 
errors. In this explanatory model, the lapses and slips in pro-
gramming of IPs pertain to the skill level, which is related 
to carrying out routine activities in familiar surroundings. 
This refers to routine tasks that are performed automatically 
and do not require the need for much thought(7).
When errors happen at this level, it indicates that there 
were failures in monitoring, i.e. a wrong control compared 
to the demand of the task. This can occur through a lack of 
attention by the individual or distractions in the environ-
ment, such as: fatigue, hours of sleep, use of drugs, fear, anxi-
ety and stress, all of which influence the automatic mode of 
thinking(7). The influence of these factors on patient safety 
have been subject of other studies.
Regarding the issue of attention, one study researched 
interruptions of nurses in their practice and how these im-
pacted patient safety. Interruptions are understood as the 
suspension of one activity to perform another, and may be 
a type of intrusion, distraction, pause and discrepancy. The 
researchers realized that the interruptions had an impact 
on the cognitive process, causing loss of concentration and 
affecting performance of activities by increasing the risk of 
errors, especially in the administration of medicine(16).
Another study sought to identify the association be-
tween the allocation of nursing staff and the occurrence 
of adverse events and incidents. The mean of the adverse 
events was greater when the nursing staff was improperly 
distributed in both sectors of the ICU investigated, lead-
ing to the conclusion that the larger the difference between 
nursing hours available compared to those required by pa-
tients, the lower the frequency of adverse events(17).
Shifts and long working hours, in turn, increase the risk 
of sleep disorders and fatigue-related errors that can have an 
impact on the patient(18). In another study with 289 nurses, 
56% of the sample showed sleep deprivation and committed 
more errors in patient care, a characteristic associated with 
working at night(19).
In the ICU, the handling of drug infusion pumps is a 
routine activity for professionals, because most hospitalized 
patients require infusion of these medicines to maintain their 
hemodynamic stability. After such professionals learn how 
to handle these devices, they do it automatically, although 
they recognize the attention that this activity requires.
It is known, however, that care in the ICU is complex 
and characterized by the simultaneous work of a multidis-
ciplinary team, which gives rise to many events happening 
simultaneously around the nursing staff. The elements of this 
environment may contribute to episodes of distraction of the 
professional in monitoring failures around the use of IPs. In 
this study, improper control happened in the lapse involving 
Nurse 2 during the registry of a parameter and as lip occurred 
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with Nurse 7, during which the technician that accompanied 
her did not perceive the alarm sound emitted by the IP.
These slips and lapses identified in the study are indicative 
of active errors, which are unsafe acts of the people who work 
directly in the system(7). A systemic approach to these errors, 
unlike a model that focuses solely on blaming the profession-
al, is based on the premise that human beings are fallible and 
that these errors are, therefore, expected within the system(7).
This also introduces the concept of latent error, which 
is an avoidable action within the system, taken on the basis 
of the decisions of managers. There are latent failures in the 
system, such as aspects related to the workload, resources 
available and experience, that in a given moment can ac-
tivate the condition of latency and result in active errors(7).
One of these latent conditions is addressed by Nurse 7, 
when she justifies the incorrect programming of the IP, 
stating that the buttons and the screen on the device were 
small, making its handling difficult for this professional. In 
this case, rather than simply classifying this error as active, 
focusing only on Nurse 7, analysis of this incident should 
consider the device design, the environment and the cir-
cumstances in which this was used.
One of the perspectives used for the analysis of the ad-
equacy of equipment is called human factors engineering, 
which evaluates a set of variables that impact the human-
machine interface. Human factors engineering determines 
whether the design of the device influences its safe and ef-
fective use by users in real situations(20).
When the design of the device does not integrate the 
interaction or interpretation that users make of the device 
interface, there is the possibility of a user error(5). This relates 
to the physical design and spacing of buttons; degree of 
intuitiveness of the design of the device; reverting to de-
fault mode without warning; overcrowding of the graphic 
interface; degree of transparency of operations, and poor 
feedback to the user about the default mode(5).
With the detailed accounts and investigation of these 
incidents with the IP and in considering the concepts of 
human factors engineering, some questions could be asked 
in this evaluation process based on aspects raised by the 
user, as visualized in empirical data, namely: are the buttons 
easy to press; are the buttons properly marked; are the set-
tings visible on the screen of the device. Such an assessment, 
by helping to understand the reason for the occurrence of 
this type of error, also helps in improving the design of the 
equipment, in order to facilitate interface with the user.
Another type of error verified in the results were mis-
takes. Misunderstandings refer to errors that are associated 
with the mental processes of judgment when outlining an 
objective and formulating intentions or selecting the means 
to achieve them, even if the actions turn out as planned(7). 
Misunderstandings can be types of mistakes based on rules 
or knowledge. The mistakes based on rules occur when the 
rule or procedure is not followed correctly, while those based 
on knowledge are with regard to not knowing the rule or 
procedure to be adopted, especially during new situations(7).
In this study, the misunderstanding is evident from the 
moment one intends to monitor the patient’s hemodynamic 
parameters as part of their therapy. It is necessary to handle 
the equipment to program the adjoining parameters, from 
which such devices send alerts to professionals which indi-
cate changes of these parameters. In this case, the program 
should consider the clinical condition of each client at the 
time of their admission or during hospitalization.
The data shows, however, registered values inconsistent 
with the situations presented, with the sending of alerts to 
nurses 5 and 12 only if the blood pressure surpassed the sys-
tolic value of 200. This shows a mistake in selection of the 
strategy, because the purpose of monitoring with regard to 
blood pressure changes were achieved, but the blood pres-
sure changes of patients involved in the scenes were not 
“transmitted” by the machines.
This mistake in the use of equipment results from not 
following the rule of individualized parameterization of the 
patient and using random parameters that do not match the 
clinical reality of the patient. The mistake can also be related 
to the knowledge required to establish the appropriate ref-
erence values, either because of difficulties in interpreting 
the objective variables about the patient sent by the ma-
chine, or in the domain of handling codes of the machine.
One study that highlights a mistake related to a fail-
ure to follow the rules of programming of equipment is 
that which identified the number and characteristics of the 
alarms of electro medical equipment in a coronary unit. Of 
a total of 426 alarm signals, 227 were triggered by multi-pa-
rameter monitors and 199 by other equipment. All patients 
observed had electrocardiogram monitoring with heart rate 
enabled, however, the arrhythmia alarm was activated only 
in 20% of patients during the daytime shift and 46% during 
the night shift. In addition, monitoring of breathing was 
turned on in only 9 of the 39 night shift patients(21).
Regarding user training for management of technolo-
gies, a literature review was done to survey complications 
presented by critical care patients during in-hospital trans-
port. In this review,the staff ’s lack of knowledge was found 
to be a cause of adverse events, because knowledge-based 
errors accounted for 54% of the incidents, including the 
error of preparation of the equipment(22).
To handle errors, the authors of the study suggest the 
creation of defensive barriers aimed at intercepting the error 
and maintenance of the safety of the system(8). Under the 
view of this lens, a model is proposed that uses the meta-
phor of Swiss cheese to explain such barriers and the trajec-
tory of an accident. Reason makes an analogy to holes in the 
cheese to refer to gap sin the defensive barriers on the basis 
of active and latent errors. When all the gaps are arranged 
on the same line, the defensive barriers are ruptured, causing 
the accident(8).
According to this author, certain conditions remain dor-
mant for years until they combine with an active error and 
generate an accident. To focus on the system, different ac-
tions to prevent the error can be performed(8). In Brazil, be-
cause concern about safety of equipment is still recent, the 
strategies aimed at creating defensive barriers are incipient, 
while French legislation requires anesthesia devices be veri-
fied with a standard checklist when opening the operating 
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room, and in Germany, there are rules pertaining to the 
formal training of all users(2).
To deal with the lapses and slip-ups, the literature high-
lights the importance of evaluating equipment by means of 
checklists and/or protocols to avoid memory lapses, fail-
ures and errors, in addition to standardizing procedures 
and directing the work(2,23). However, with regard to errors, 
studies(2-3, 5, 22)indicate the need for educational improve-
ment among health professionals, particularly nurses. In 
this perspective, the theoretical, practical and scientific un-
derstanding of the technological innovations, incorporating 
evidence-based practices, promotes clinical competence of 
nurses, as well as patient safety(24-25).
CONCLUSION
Errors were identified such as slips, lapses and mistakes 
in the use of equipment by the nurses in the ICU, mainly 
in the use infusion pumps and monitoring systems, which 
involve adverse events that harm patient safety.
Understanding the mechanisms that explain such errors 
underscores the influence of different aspects, depending on 
the level at which the activity to be performed is situated. 
These are, memory and attention lapses in handling of IP 
ability; planning failures during programming of the moni-
tors; application of rules and knowledge. In the systemic 
analysis of the errors, the objective is not to identify the 
culprit for punishment, but to know how the error occurred. 
This is not to say that there is no responsibility on the part 
of the nurses, since individual characteristics are also exam-
ined, such as relaxed and carefree attitudes.
In the field studied, the authors propose an instrument 
for daily checking of equipment, where checks are per-
formed of the programming of infusion pumps and moni-
tors, in order to reduce errors and memory lapses. It should 
be noted that the observation was restricted to the day shift, 
which limited the number of participants and prevented a 
larger range of results. In addition, it was not possible to 
assess the linkages of errors with professional experience.
RESUMO
Objetivo: Identificar a ocorrência de erros na utilização de equipamentos por enfermeiros que atuam na terapia intensiva, analisando-
os à luz da teoria do erro humano de James Reason. Método: Pesquisa de campo, qualitativa, na Unidade de Terapia Intensiva de um 
hospital federal do Rio de Janeiro. Realizou-se observação e entrevista com oito enfermeiros, de março a dezembro de 2014. Aplicou-se 
análise de conteúdo nas entrevistas e descrição densa nas cenas observadas. Resultados: Identificaram-se falhas de memória e de atenção 
no manuseio das bombas infusoras e falhas de planejamento durante a programação dos monitores. Conclusão: Os erros causam eventos 
adversos que comprometem a segurança do paciente. Propõe-se um instrumento de verificação diária dos equipamentos, com checagens 
ao longo do processo de trabalho da programação das bombas infusoras e monitores, no intuito de reduzir as falhas e esquecimentos.
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RESUMEN
Objetivo: Identificar la ocurrencia de errores en la utilización de equipos por enfermeros que actúan en cuidados intensivos, analizándolos 
a la luz de la teoría del error humano de James Reason. Método: Investigación de campo, cualitativa en la Unidad de Cuidados 
Intensivos de un hospital federal de Río de Janeiro. Se llevó a cabo la observación y entrevista con ocho enfermeros, de marzo a 
diciembre de 2014. Se aplicó análisis de contenido en las entrevistas y descripción densa en las escenas observadas. Resultados: Se 
identificaron fallos de memoria y atención en el manejo de las bombas de infusión y fallos de planificación durante la programación de 
los monitores. Conclusión: Los errores causan eventos adversos que comprometen la seguridad del paciente. Se propone un instrumento 
de verificación diaria de los equipos, con chequeos a lo largo del proceso laboral de la programación de las bombas de infusión y 
monitores, a fin que reducir los fallos y olvidos.
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